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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
DEAN ALLEN MOGEN, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20010207-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an order dismissing one count of 
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third 
degree felony, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, 
a class B misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction over the case 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Was defendant still seized within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment after the deputy sheriff, who had stopped defendant's 
vehicle for speeding, issued a verbal warning citation, returned 
defendant's documents, told him he was free to go, and stepped 
back from the vehicle? 
A bifurcated standard of review governs here. The trial 
court's findings of fact are reviewed deferentially and should be 
1 
reversed only if they are clearly erroneous. The court's 
conclusions of law growing out of the factual findings, however, 
are reviewed for correctness, giving some measure of discretion 
to the trial court in applying the legal standards to the facts. 
See State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994); State v. 
Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 916 P.2d 
909 (Utah 1996). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides in pertinent part: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated. . . . 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with one count each of 
possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug 
paraphernalia (R. 4). Following a preliminary hearing, the case 
was bound over to district court, where defendant filed a motion 
to suppress (R. 26, 36-40). After a hearing on the motion, the 
court suppressed the evidence, and the case was dismissed (R. 60-
62, 71; R. 56-59 or addendum A). The State filed a timely notice 
of appeal (R. 64-65) . 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 22, 2000, Deputy Sheriff Troy Slaw of the Uintah 
County Sheriff's Office stopped a large Dodge flatbed truck for 
speeding on SR40 near rural Jensen, Utah (R. 71: 2, 6). Leaving 
his overhead lights flashing to alert other motorists of the 
stopped vehicles by the side of the road, Slaw approached the 
truck, which was driven by defendant, and asked for and obtained 
defendant's driver's license (Id. at 3, 9). The officer then 
returned to his own vehicle to run a routine license check (Id. 
at 3) . After a few minutes, the check came back clear, and Slaw 
returned to defendant's vehicle (Id.). 
Slaw returned defendant's documents and issued a verbal 
warning for speeding (Id. at 3, 8, 13, 16). He also stated that 
he explicitly advised defendant that he was free to leave (Id. at 
3, 4, 13, 16). Defendant did not respond to the officer's 
statements to him (Id. at 3). The officer also testified that he 
did not physically obstruct defendant's departure in any way (Id. 
at 10) . 
Slaw turned to go, taking a "couple of steps" towards his 
patrol vehicle (Id. at 4). He then turned back towards 
defendant, and again made contact with him by asking if he had 
any illegal drugs or weapons in the truck and if defendant would 
mind if he "took a look" (Id. at 4, 8). Defendant responded that 
it would be fine (Id. at 4). When the officer searched the 
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truck, he discovered the items of contraband forming the basis of 
the criminal charges against defendant (Id. at 4/ R. 72: 6-8, 8-
9) . 
For his part, defendant testified that he did not remember 
the officer telling him he was free to go and that if the officer 
did tell him, he did not hear it (Id. at 13, 16). Defendant 
further testified that when the officer returned his driver's 
license, he stared at defendant for a few seconds, causing 
defendant to feel that the officer "had something more to say" 
(Id. at 14). When asked why he did not leave, defendant 
responded that the officer's flasher lights were still on and 
also that he was unsure he could safely pull away, given that his 
truck had flared-out sides and the officer was standing nearby 
(Id. at 14-15) . Defendant did not dispute that he consented to 
the search of his vehicle (Id. at 15). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in determining that the Fourth 
Amendment seizure was continuous and that all evidence seized 
pursuant to defendant's consent to search must, therefore, be 
suppressed. The constitutionally-protected seizure ended when 
the officer issued a verbal warning, returned defendant's 
documents, told defendant he was free to go, and turned away from 
defendant, taking a couple of steps towards his patrol vehicle. 
At that juncture, the seizure de-escalated to a voluntary level 
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one encounter. The status of the subsequent discussion between 
the officer and defendant was, therefore, a level one voluntary 
encounter, to which the protections of the Fourth Amendment do 
not apply. Because defendant gave his consent to search during a 
voluntary encounter, the evidence discovered as a result should 
not have been suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
DETERMINING THAT DEFENDANT WAS 
STILL SEIZED WITHIN THE MEANING OF 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AFTER THE 
OFFICER, WHO HAD STOPPED DEFENDANT 
FOR SPEEDING, ISSUED A VERBAL 
WARNING, RETURNED HIS DOCUMENTS, 
TOLD HIM HE WAS FREE TO GO, AND 
STEPPED BACK FROM THE VEHICLE 
In granting defendant's suppression motion, the trial court 
determined that defendant was not free to go after the officer 
gave him a warning citation, returned his documents, and turned 
and took a couple of steps back toward his patrol vehicle (R. 58 
or addendum A). Concluding that defendant was, therefore, 
continually seized from the moment the officer stopped him, the 
court suppressed all evidence discovered during the subsequent 
consensual search of the truck (R. 43). 
Specifically, the trial court articulated the following 
relevant findings of fact as the basis for its ruling: 
4. Deputy Slaugh [sic]. . . returned to the 
defendant his license and any other paper the 
defendant had given him. Deputy Slaugh gave 
the defendant a warning for the speeding 
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violation and then turned and took a couple 
steps back toward his vehicle. 
5. At this time, Deputy Slaugh's overhead 
lights were still flashing. 
6. Within a few seconds Deputy Slaugh 
stepped back to the driver's window and asked 
the defendant if he had, "any guns, drugs, 
knives or bombs" in his vehicle. Defendant 
replied negatively. Deputy Slaugh then asked 
the defendant for permission to look. 
R. 58 at addendum A. Based on these facts, the court concluded 
that the Fourth Amendment seizure was continuous and that it did 
not de-escalate into a level one voluntary encounter when the 
officer returned defendant's documents and turned and took a few 
steps back toward his patrol car: 
2. Based on the facts of this case, the 
defendant did not reasonably feel comfortable 
in leaving, and the court finds that the 
natural inference is that the defendant was 
still being detained when the deputy asked 
his peirmission to search the defendant's 
vehicle. 
3. The defendant voluntarily consented to a 
search of the vehicle he was driving, 
however, the consent was obtained while the 
defendant was still within the arena of the 
detention of the traffic stop. 
Id. at 58. 
The court's oral remarks at the suppression hearing 
illuminate more fully the rationale underlying the written 
ruling: 
And it would seem to me to be on the basis of 
the facts that I have heard, to draw a fine 
line between handing him his license and 
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registration back and telling him he was just 
going to warn him for speeding would seem to 
me that it would be inappropriate for 
[defendant] to even think about leaving or 
getting out on the highway, reasonably, to 
me, until the Officer was safely back in his 
vehicle and had the lights shut off. That 
would be a reasonable assumption on my part. 
I think that the finding is though, that 
given the context of the search, the size of 
the highway, the rural nature of the highway, 
that the fact that the officer wasn't safely 
back in his vehicle and the lights were still 
going, at least for the instantaneous time it 
took the officer to get back to the door and 
ask for the search, I think it would be 
unreasonable to assume [defendant] felt 
comfortable in leaving. I guess it goes on 
the facts and how I would react. That's how 
I feel about it. 
R. 24-25, 25-26 at addendum B. 
The gist of the court's ruling, then, is that the return of 
defendant's documents did not de-escalate the Fourth Amendment 
seizure to a level one voluntary encounter because defendant had 
"objectively reasonable cause" to believe he was still seized. 
The continuing seizure seems based on two facts - that the 
officer had not yet returned to his patrol vehicle and that he 
had not yet turned off his flasher lights.1 
1
 While the court also mentioned "the context of the 
search, the size of the highway, [and] the rural nature of the 
highway," it failed to explain how these factors impacted the 
conclusion that defendant was not free to leave (R. 71 at 25). 
In contrast, the court repeatedly mentioned that the officer had 
not returned to his patrol car and that his flasher lights were 
still on (Id.). 
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The trial court's analysis is flawed because it gives undue 
weight to these two facts while failing to consider others, as a 
proper analysis requires. State v. Higgins, 884 P.2d 1242, 1244 
(Utah 1994)(citations omitted). 
The proper legal analysis begins with an assessment of 
whether one is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes. Here, 
defendant was plainly seized when the deputy sheriff stopped his 
truck for speeding. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 
(1979)(stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants 
constitutes a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes). 
Because defendant was seized, the dispositive analysis turns 
on how long the initial, constitutionally-protected seizure 
lasted.2 Once an individual has been seized, for the seizure to 
end, it must be clear to the seized person, either from the words 
of an officer or from the clear import of the circumstances, that 
the person is at liberty to go about his or her business. 
Higgins, 884 P.2d at 1244 (citing United States v. Sandoval, 29 
2
 See State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 
1987)(quoting United States v. Merritt. 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th 
Cir. 1984)(citation omitted))(articulating three categories of 
constitutionally permitted police-citizen encounters). The three 
categories of constitutionally permitted police-citizen 
encounters are, of course, not static. Thus, a level one 
consensual encounter can escalate into a level two seizure or a 
level three arrest, or vice versa. See United States v. Shareef, 
100 F.3d 1491, 1500 (10th Cir. 1996)(explaining relationship 
between levels of police-citizen encounters). Only the second 
and third levels, however, implicate the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225, 
1227 (Utah App. 1997). 
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F.3d 537, 540-41 (10th Cir. 1994)). 
In determining whether a detainee is free to go, courts look 
to several circumstances. The return of a detained driver's 
documents signals one line of demarcation. Thus, federal courts 
"have consistently concluded that an officer must return a 
driver's documentation before a detention can end." United 
States v. Elliott, 107 F.3d 810, 814 (10th Cir. 1997)(citing 
United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 979 (10th Cir. 1996) and 
United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1404 (10th Cir. 1990)). 
That action, however, will not necessarily render any subsequent 
interchange consensual "if the driver has objectively reasonable 
cause to believe that he or she is not free to leave." United 
States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1501 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing 
United States v. Turner, 928 F.2d 956, 959 (10th Cir.), cert, 
denied 502 U.S. 881 (1991)); accord Elliott, 107 F.3d at 814 (and 
cases cited therein). In this case, where the parties agree that 
the officer returned defendant's documentation, the court must 
look to see if defendant had other objective reasonable cause to 
believe he was not free to leave (R. 71: 3, 8, 13). 
The officer's words constitute an important part of the 
analysis. Certainly, telling the detainee that he is free to 
leave is a strong indication that a seizure is over. 
Nonetheless, the police need not necessarily tell a detainee 
explicitly that he is free to go in order for a seizure to de-
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escalate into a consensual encounter. Ohio v. Robinette. 519 
U.S. 33, 33-34 (1996). Here, the trial court, faced with 
differing testimony from the two witnesses present, refused to 
enter a finding about the officer's words. At the suppression 
hearing, after articulating oral findings and conclusions 
suppressing the evidence found in the truck, the trial court 
asked whether counsel wanted any additional findings (R. 71: 25 
at addendum B). The following colloquy occurred: 
Prosecution: Yes, would you please make a 
finding concerning whether or 
not the officer indicated that 
[defendant] was free to go? 
The Court: I can't make a finding on 
that. The evidence was 
contrary. I mean, the officer 
said you're free to go. 
[Defendant] said he didn't 
hear him say that. The Court 
has an insufficient record to 
make a finding on that. 
Id. at 25. The trial court's determination that it could not 
make a finding on whether the officer told defendant he was free 
to leave is clearly erroneous. 
Officer Troy Slaw testified at both the preliminary hearing 
and the suppression hearing. On both occasions, he unequivocally 
stated that, after returning defendant's documents, he told 
defendant that he was free to go (R. 72: 4, 17; R. 71: 3, 10). 
Defendant testified at the suppression hearing, stating, "I don't 
recall him telling me I was free to go" (R. 71: 13). Later in 
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the hearing, the following interchange occurred: 
Prosecution: After he'd given you back your 
driver's license and your 
registration, he had told you 
that he was not going to cite 
you for the speeding, is that 
correct? 
Defendant: Exactly. 
Prosecution: And you do not recall whether 
or not he said you were free 
to go? 
Defendant: No. 
Prosecution: It's possible that he did? 
Defendant: Well, I didn't hear him say 
it. 
R. 71: 16. Defendant's testimony about what the officer said 
regarding his freedom to leave is quoted in its entirety. At no 
time did defendant testify that the officer told him he could not 
leave. Nor did defendant testify that the officer did not tell 
him he was free to go. Rather, defendant's testimony consisted 
of two statements: first, that he could not recall whether or not 
the officer told him he was free to go; and second, that he did 
not hear the officer say that he was free to go. Id. 
Defendant's lack of recall or inability to hear should not 
have precluded the trial court from entering a finding of fact as 
to whether the officer told defendant he was free to leave. At 
the outset, the evidence was not contrary, as the trial court 
averred. That is, one person can easily make a statement that 
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another either does not remember or does not hear.3 Moreover, 
even if the evidence had been contrary, it was the trial court's 
role, as finder of fact, to make the necessary credibility 
determination to resolve the factual dispute between the 
witnesses. See, e.g., State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 
1993); ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson. 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah App. 
1997). The trial court erred by abrogating this responsibility. 
Kinkella v. Bauah, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983). 
If this Court determines that the omission of the factual 
finding is dispositive to the outcome of this appeal, then this 
Court should remand the case for resolution of the material 
factual issue. If it is not, then this Court may dispose of the 
matter as harmless error. See Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1025 
(Utah App. 1993). 
In addition to the return of the driver's documents and the 
words of the officer, courts also look to the conduct of the 
police towards the detainee in evaluating the objective 
reasonableness of the circumstances facing a detainee: 
Examples of circumstances that might indicate 
a sei2:ure, even where the person did not 
attempt to leave, would be the threatening 
presence of several officers, the display of 
a weapon by an officer, some physical 
touching of the person of the citizen, or the 
use of language or tone of voice indicating 
3
 In fact, the only real conflict in the evidence was 
defendant's internal inconsistency in testifying both that he did 
not remember and that he did not hear (Id. at 13, 16). 
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that compliance with the officer's request 
might be compelled. 
State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 659 (Utah App. 1996) (citing 
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980)(citations 
omitted))/ accord State v. Anderson, 114 F.3d 1059, 1064 (10th 
Cir. 1997); Turner, 928 F.2d at 959. In this case, there is no 
record evidence that the lone officer drew his weapon, physically 
touched the defendant in any way, or used language or a tone of 
voice indicating that defendant might be compelled to remain. 
See Patefield, 927 P.2d at 659 (citations omitted). Indeed, the 
only evidence supporting a continued detention was defendant's 
testimony that the uniformed officer "stared" at him for "just a 
few seconds" after returning his documents (R. 71: 13-14). 
The case of People v. Brownlee, 713 N.E.2d 556 (111. 1999) 
is instructive on this point. There, defendant was stopped for a 
traffic violation, and the officer checked and returned his 
documents. Id. at 559. The officer himself testified that after 
explaining he would not issue a citation, he then "'paused' for 
'a couple [of] minutes'" while he stood at the driver's door and 
another officer stood at the passenger door. Id. at 565. He 
then asked for and obtained permission to search. The court 
determined that standing by the door silently for at least two 
minutes constituted a "show of authority" by the police and that 
a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave under such 
circumstances. Id. at 565-66. Further, in response to the 
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request to search, defendant asked if he had a choice in the 
matter, thus reinforcing the court's determination that defendant 
was not free to go. Id. at 566. 
Contrast the facts in Brownlee with the case at bar, where 
defendant, not the officer, testified that the lone officer 
stared at him, but "for just a few seconds" (R. 71: 14). 
Defendant's candid admission that the officer's "stare" was 
fleeting supports the conclusion that, unlike Brownlee, the 
Fourth Amendment seizure here had ended. In addition, when asked 
if his truck could be searched, defendant in this case answered 
that it would be "fine," thus giving no indication that he felt 
in any way compelled (Id. at 4). 
In addition, both defendant and the State agree that Officer 
Slaw either stepped back and moved away from the truck or turned 
around and took a couple of steps towards his patrol vehicle (Id. 
at 4, 16). Under either scenario, the officer's undisputed 
physical withdrawal also supports the termination of the 
constitutionally protected seizure. See Commonwealth v. 
Strickler, 757 A.2d 884, 900 (Pa. 2000) (in determining that 
seizure ended, court stated that although officer did not utter 
explicit words of release, his actions of returning documents, 
thanking defendant for cooperation, and turning away prior to 
reinitiating interaction "at least suggested" that defendant was 
free to go). 
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The trial court's analysis is flawed not only because it 
fails to consider these aspects of the encounter but also because 
it gives undue weight to two other factors - the brief time 
between the officer's withdrawal and his recontact with 
defendant, and the fact that the officer had not yet returned to 
his vehicle and turned off his flasher lights. 
First, as to the length of the time between the officer 
stepping away and his recontact with defendant as an indicator of 
a continuing seizure, the court has distorted the proper test (R. 
71: 25). Logically, the assessment of when a seizure ends must 
be made as of the point in time, however brief, when the facts 
indicate that defendant is free to go. See Mendenhall. 446 U.S. 
at 545-46. To apply the test in hindsight, after subsequent 
interactions, confuses the analysis by tacking on later events 
that skew the legal status of the encounter at the moment it 
shifts to a voluntary encounter. 
Second, the court's analysis puts undue weight on the 
officer's return to his vehicle. The court stated that "it would 
be inappropriate for [defendant] to even think about leaving or 
getting out on the highway, reasonably, to me, until the officer 
was safely back in his vehicle and had the lights shut off. That 
would be a reasonable assumption on my part" (R. 71: 25 at 
addendum B). The trial court has offered no support for this new 
legal standard by which to assess when a Fourth Amendment seizure 
15 
has ended, and the State finds no support for such a proposition. 
Because the facts demonstrate that the Fourth Amendment 
seizure de-escalated to a level one voluntary encounter when the 
officer returned defendant's documents, issued a verbal warning, 
told him he was free to go, and turned and stepped away from 
defendant's truck, this Court should reverse the trial court's 
dismissal of the case and remand for further proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should reverse the 
district court order dismissing the charges against defendant and 
remand the case for trial. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this Jj£_ day of October, 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEAN ALLEN MOGEN, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
No. 001800211 
Judge John R. Anderson 
This matter came on for an Evidentiary Hearing before John R. 
Anderson, Eighth District Court, on November 29, 2000, on 
defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
The State of Utah was represented by Attorney G. Mark Thomas. 
Defendant was present and represented by his attorney, Richard P. 
Mauro. 
Uintah County Sheriff Deputy Troy Slaugh was called as a 
witness for the State and was cross examined. Dean Allen Mogen was 
called as a witness for the defense and was cross examined. 
The Court, after hearing the evidence and arguments of 
counsel, does enter its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On August 22, 2000, Deputy Troy Slaugh stopped the 
defendant, Dean Allen Mogen, for exceeding the posted 50 mph speed 
limit on State Route 40 in the Jensen, Utah area. 
2. The defendant was the only person in the vehicle which 
was a truck used in defendant's work. 
3. Deputy Slaugh asked for and received defendant's driver 
license and possibly the vehicle registration. Deputy Slaugh then 
went back to his patrol car and performed a routine driver's 
license and warrants check. 
4. Deputy Slaugh then returned to the driver side of the 
defendant's vehicle and returned to the defendant his license and 
any other paper the defendant had given him. Deputy Slaugh gave 
the defendant a warning for the speeding violation and then turned 
and took a couple steps back toward his vehicle. 
5. At this time Deputy Slaugh's overhead lights were still 
flashing. 
6. Within a few seconds Deputy Slaugh stepped back to the 
driver's window and asked the defendant if he had, "any guns, 
drugs, knives or bombs' in his vehicle. Defendant replied 
negatively. Deputy Slaugh then asked the defendant for permission 
to look. 
7. The defendant agreed to allow Deputy Slaugh to look in his 
vehicle. 
2 
CONCLUSIONS OP LAW 
1. On August 22, 2000, Deputy Troy Slaugh made a legal 
traffic stop on the vehicle which the defendant was the sole 
occupant in. 
2. Based on facts of this case, the defendant did not 
reasonably feel comfortable in leaving, and the court finds that 
the natural inference is that the defendant was still being 
detained when the deputy asked his permission to search the 
defendant's vehicle. 
3. The defendant voluntarily consented to a search of the 
vehicle he was driving, however, the consent was obtained while the 
defendant was still within the arena of the detention of the 
traffic stop. 
4. Based on the case law for Utah, an officer does not have 
the right to ask for consent to search a vehicle during a traffic 
stop unless there is an independent constitutionally permitted 
basis for either the request or the search. 
DATED this l^day of <?4$' ^vO. 2001. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Richard Mauro 





cases that have been cited by defense counsel are not cases 
wheiein there's been a clear break and a return of the items. 
Most of those cases, the ones that I've been familiar with, are 
where the officer actually continued the detention and either 
did not return the driver's license or in some other way 
continued the existing detention. 
That's not the case here. There was a clear break 
and what the courts have been saying in Utah are basically, 
there has to be some sort of continuation from the traffic stop 
versus the next contact which was voluntary and consensual 
which occurred in this case. He had returned everything, told 
the defendant he was free to go, stepped back and then made a 
new contact and sought consent. 
THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. 
These cases are very fact sensitive and the Court is 
familiar with the Utah State Case Law and some of the Court of 
Appeals decisions regarding these issues. Some of them are 
hard to distinguish but I think the distinguishing thing that 
we need to focus on would be given the context of the setting, 
and the context of the rural area, the context of many things, 
it would seem to me, was Mr. Mogen reasonably justified in 
believing that he could go ahead and leave? And it would seem 
to me to be on the basis of the facts that I have heard, to 
draw a fine line between handing him his license and 
registration back and telling him he was just going to warn him 
24 
1 for speeding, would seem to me that it would be inappropriate 
2 for Mr* Mogen to even think about leaving or getting out on the 
3 highway, reasonably, to me, until the Officer was safely back 
4 in his vehicle and had the lights shut off. That would be a 
5 reasonable assumption on my part. 
6 I think the fact of the hesitancy, the quick return 
7 by the officer and asking for the consent search went beyond 
8 the scope of the original stop and I think in this case, that 
9 Mr, Mogen would, by the testimony that I've heard, was not 
10 justified in feeling that he was free to leave. So, I'm going 
11 to suppress the evidence. That will be the ruling. Do you 
12 want me to make any additional findings? 
13 I MR. THOMAS: Yes, would you please make a finding 
14 concerning whether or not the officer indicated that he was 
15 free to go? 
16 THE COURT: I can't make a finding on that. The 
17 evidence was contrary. I mean, the officer said you're free to 
18 [ go. Mr. Mogen said he didn't hear him say that. The Court has 
19 an insufficient record to make a finding on that. I think that 
20 the finding ia though, that given the context of the search, 
21 the size of the highway, the rural nature of the highway, that 
22 the fact that the officer wasn't safely back in his vehicle and 
23 the lights were still going, at least for the instantaneous 
24 time it took the officer to get back to the door and ask for 
25 J the search, I think it would be unreasonable to assume Mr. 
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1 Mogen felt comfortable in leaving. I guess it goes on the 
2 facts and how I would react. That's how I feel about it. 
3 MR. THOMAS: And are you finding this under the 
4 United States Constitution or the Utah Constitution? 
5 THE COURT: I'm looking at the Utah Case Law and 
6 relying on Mr. Mauro's argument there. I do not know what fact 
7 distinctions there are specifically in the cases cited, Mr. 
8 Thomas but I know that in this case, it would seem to me, that 
9 1 Mr. Mogen would not have felt comfortable in leaving before the 
10 officer returned and asked to search the vehicle. 
11 MR. THOMAS: So is it the Court's finding that an 
12 officer cannot seek consent unless it's reasonable that the 
13 defendant feels comfortable in leaving? 
14 THE COURT: No. No. I think he was detained. I 
15 think the reasonable inference was that he was still being 
16 detained. I don't want to make a hard line rule on it. I'm 
17 telling you that they are fact sensitive and it is my feeling, 
18 my view of the evidence, that Mr. Mogen was still in the arena 
19 I of detention when the consent was sought. 
20 MRv THOMAS: Okay. 
21 THE COURT: And it exceeded the scope of the original 
22 stop* 
23 MR. THOMAS: An additional fact, is it the Court's 
24 finding that the officer did in fact step away from the window 
25 I after -
26 
THE COURT: That's what the evidence showed. He 
stepped away, although it may have been unsafe for him to be 
where he was. We don't have distance in feet. We don't have a 
video. He stepped away. The testimony was within a few 
seconds, he was there, back. 
Thank you, counsel. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded.) 
